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Abstract 
Responding to the current narratives about the impending planetary catastrophe 
caused by our human activity, this philosophy-cum-art piece develops a more 
affirmative story about life, death and extinction. Framed as a non-normative 
ethics for the Anthropocene, it considers the human’s expanded obligations 
towards the bio- and geosphere, while also critically reflecting on the very 
constitution of this “human”.  
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Life typically becomes an object of reflection when it is seen 
to be under threat. In particular, we humans have a tendency to 
engage in thinking about life (instead of just continuing to live 
it) when being made to confront the prospect of death: be it the 
death of individuals due to illness, accident or old age; the 
death of whole ethnic or national groups in wars and other 
forms of conflict; but also of whole populations, be they hu-
man or nonhuman ones. Even though this article concerns it-
self first and foremost with life – comprehended as both a 
biological and social phenomenon – it is the narrative about the 
impending extinction of the human species, which we can also 
describe as “the stoppage of human life”, that provides a con-
text for my argument. In contemporary popular science and 
mainstream media the problem of extinction is presented as 
something both inevitable and impending. To cite British sci-
entist Stephen Emmott, the current situation in which we find 
ourselves can be most adequately described as “an unprece-
dented planetary emergency” for which the human species is 
solely responsible [1]. 
Apocalyptic narratives of this kind are nothing new, in both 
our history and art history. My aim here is to take some steps 
toward telling a different story about the world and our human 
existence in and with it when life itself is said to be under a 
unique threat. I want to ask what kind of life is produced, put 
in motion but also constrained by the current geopolitics and 
what kind of agency can regulate its movement. This leads to 
another question: can we imagine and enact some different, 
and better, forms of life? I am mindful here of philosopher 
John Gray’s admonition that “the planet does not care about 
the stories that humans tell themselves; it responds to what 
humans do, and is changing irreversibly as a result” [2]. Gray 
is no doubt correct in his skepticism, yet we humans do care 
about the stories we tell ourselves. More importantly, stories 
have a performative nature: they can enact and not just de-
scribe things – even if there are of course limits to what they 
are capable of enacting. This article is one such story about life 
and death at both macro and micro scales. It is also an art piece 
that uses the medium of language, embracing philosophy as a 
form of reimagining the world to start thinking about the pos-
sibility of outlining a viable position on ethics. In other words, 
I want to ask how we can live a good life at this geo-historical 
moment that is currently being described as the “Anthro-
pocene” – and about what constitutes this goodness. Proposed 
by the Dutch chemist Paul Crutzen in 2000, the term 
“Anthropocene” names a new geological epoch that supposed-
ly follows the Holocene, “the epoch that began at the end of 
the last ice age, 11,700 years ago, and that – officially, at least 
– continues to this day” [3]. Our human influence upon the 
geo- and biosphere via processes such as farming, deforesta-
tion, mining and urbanization is said to have been so immense 
that it actually merits a new designation in order to address the 
challenges raised by that influence.  
It is not only the term “Anthropocene” that remains conten-
tious though: the very “we” of the argument developed here is 
also posited as a problem, referring as it does to what philoso-
phy and tradition have designated as “humans” while opening 
onto a complex and dynamic network of relations in which 
“we humans” are produced as humans and in which we remain 
entangled with nonhuman entities. The inspiration for this 
piece comes from a wedding of ecosex artists Beth Stephens 
and Annie Sprinkle, who married Lake Kallavesi in Northern 
Savonia at the ANTI Contemporary Art Festival in Kuopio, 
Finland, on September 30, 2012. This human-nonhuman wed-
ding between more than two parties wasn’t Stephens and 
Sprinkle’s first: in previous ceremonies they had married the 
Earth, the Sea, the Snow and the Rocks, thus playfully taking 
on and enacting Donna Haraway’s naturocultural kinship. Ste-
phens and Sprinkle’s performance points to a different mode of 
philosophizing, one that borrows from artistic sensibilities and 
that produces ideas with things and events rather than just with 
words. This mode of philosophical production is necessarily 
fragmented: it gives up on any desire to forge systems, ontolo-
gies or worlds and makes itself content with minor interven-
tions into material and conceptual unfoldings. It is also 
embodied and immersed, responding to the call of matter and 
its various materializations – such as humans, animals, plants, 
inanimate objects, as well as the relations between them. This 
mode of work remains suspicious towards any current attempts 
to (re)turn to ontology, in both its idealist and materialist guis-
es, as a predominant mode of “doing philosophy”. It sees any 
such attempts for what they are: ways of producing and hence 
also mastering “the world” and then passing it on (as fact) to 
others.
The reflections offered here are linked to my previous work 
on what it means to live a good life at a time when any attempt 
to define such goodness opens up to a political antagonism 
between opposing claims but also, more importantly, when the 
very notion of life is undergoing a radical reformulation, both 
on a philosophical and biotechnological level. Rather than 
engage in the work of philosophical critique, I am now primar-
ily concerned with the possibility of developing an affirmative 
proposal for an ethics that makes sense – and that senses its 
own making [4]. This idea of the ethical call of matter expands 
on my argument from Bioethics in the Age of New Media [5], 
in which I positioned bioethics as an originary philosophy, 
situated even before ontology. That idea was inspired by the 
work of Emmanuel Levinas, although I was troubled by the 
humanist limitations of Levinas’ ethics, whereby a primordial 
responsibility exerted upon me always came from human oth-
ers. In bioethics as an “ethics of life” the way I understand it, 
the human self has to respond to an expanded set of obligations 
that affect her, allow for her differentiation from the world 
around her, and demand a response that is not just a reaction. 
While I do recognize, together with other theorists of post-
anthropocentric thought, that “it is not all about us”, I also 
acknowledge the singular human responsibility which is exer-
cised both by philosophical theory (consciously undertaken by 
few) and philosophical practice (being a more widespread un-
dertaking, even if not always a conscious one).  
My method can be loosely described as “critical vitalism”. It 
involves rethinking and remaking “life” – as both a social con-
struct and a carbon-based construct – and what we can do with 
it. Taking such life as a (yet) non-valorized, historically specif-
ic minimal condition, critical vitalism remains attuned to stop-
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pages in life, seeing life as both a becoming and a fracturing 
process. If, as Tim Ingold claims, “Wherever there is life there 
is movement” [6], we can perhaps also add that wherever there 
is movement there also tends to be stoppage (otherwise how 
would we be able to recognize movement as movement?). It is 
precisely this tension between movement as an enabling force 
of becoming – a point we can develop not just from Bergson 
and Deleuze but also from Ingold – and stoppage as an inevi-
table alteration in the rhythm of life that is of interest to me 
here. Critical vitalism considers how differences in movement 
and speed ensue and matter, who they matter to, how matter 
resists and recoils, and to what effect. In this context, ethics 
becomes a way of taking responsibility, by the human, for var-
ious sorts of thickenings of the universe, across different 
scales, and of responding to the tangled mesh of everyday con-
nections and relations. This is how human agency can be exer-
cised – although we have to bear in mind that such agency is 
partly nonhuman, never fully conscious and always “entan-
gled” [7].  
Also, agency can only become theorized post-factum, be-
coming a designation for something happening, after it has 
happened. Agency is therefore not something humans, animals 
and other beings or even inanimate entities have, the way so-
cial scientists have traditionally understood it (be it in their 
studies of the relationship between structure and agency, or, 
more recently, under the guise of the Actor-Network Theory). 
Rather, agency is something that unfolds in the movement of 
life: it is a set of actions and relations through which some-
thing occurs. But there are perhaps good reasons not to give up 
too early on the notion of agency, even if we do not see it as 
separate from the multiple processes of the world’s 
“worlding”. The differentiation between process and entity is 
always a heuristic, but it can be a useful device for us humans 
who are involved in the pastime of thinking: it allows us to 
develop a discourse about what we call the world – and about 
ourselves in that world. Agency therefore becomes something 
that the emergent human can mobilize in order to develop a 
meaningful discourse that matters.  
Ethics is the name we have given to this long-established 
tradition of reflecting on the emergence of customs, morals and 
values across nature and culture. In other words, even if the 
difference between the human and other living entities is more 
of degree than of kind, and even if human agency is just posit-
ed rather than actual, designating a reduction of life to causes, 
effects, actions and objects, ethics is one of the practices in 
which human singularity – which is not to be confused with 
human supremacy – manifests itself. It manifests itself particu-
larly strongly in the current geological epoch: this manifesta-
tion is what the term Anthropocene stands for. Yet ethics is 
also arguably a tool through which the Anthropocene can be 
both apprehended and amended. My own use of the term 
“Anthropocene” is therefore as an ethical pointer rather than as 
a scientific descriptor. In other words, the Anthropocene serves 
for me as a designation of the human obligation towards the 
geo- and biosphere. Even if the Anthropocene is about “the age 
of man”, the ethical thinking it calls for is strongly post-
anthropocentric, as indicated earlier, in the sense that it does 
not consider the human to be the most important species, nor 
does it see the world as arranged solely for human use and 
benefit. The term does, however, entail an appeal to human 
singularity, coupled with a recognition that we can make a 
difference to the ongoing dynamic processes taking in the bio-
sphere and the geosphere – of which we are part. An ethics for 
the Anthropocene is not just an updated form of environmental 
ethics: it does not pivot on any coherent notion of an “envi-
ronment” as an identifiable entity but rather concerns itself 
with dynamic relations between entities across various scales 
such as stem cells, dogs, humans, rivers, electricity pylons, 
computer networks and planets.  
The starting premise of this kind of ethical thinking is that 
we humans are making a difference to the arrangements of “the 
world”, to its unfolding and speed. (The making of this differ-
ence could be termed “soft agency”.) Naturally, we are not the 
only or even the most important actors that are making such a 
difference. It would but extremely naive and short-sighted to 
assume that, as it would be to claim that we can affect or con-
trol any occurrences within that world – but we are perhaps 
uniquely placed to turn the making of such difference into an 
ethical task. Thanks to our human ability to tell stories and to 
philosophize, we can not only grasp, to some extent, the deep 
historical stratification of values through an involvement in 
what Deleuze and Guattari call “a geology of morals” [8] but 
also work out possibilities for making what we will agree, 
through deliberation, policy work and conflict resolution, to be 
better differences across various scales. While our participa-
tion in the differentiation of matter is ongoing, frequently col-
lective or distributed, and often unconscious, ethics names a 
situation when those processes of differentiation are accounted 
for – when they occur as a cognitive-affective effort to re-
arrange the solidified moral strata, with a view to producing a 
more sustainable geo-moral landscape (one that sustains not 
only us humans but also other beings as well as itself). Ethics 
is therefore a form of managing the movement of life, per-
formed from within life itself. Even if I remain wary of capital-
V values, I adopt one minimal assumption for this ethical pro-
ject: a conviction that we have a responsibility to engage with 
life – materially and conceptually – because, as we know from 
Socrates, “the unexamined life is not worth living”. What 
counts as the examination of life goes beyond the Socratic 
method of inquiry instantiated between two parties with a view 
to eliminating erroneous hypotheses. It also involves 
physicalist engagement with the matter of life, with its parti-
cles and unfoldings. This is why performance artists such as 
Sprinkle and Stephens, but also so-called “bioartists” like Oron 
Catts and Ionat Zurr of SymbioticA, who are not scared of 
getting their hands and minds dirty with the stuff of life, are 
perhaps better placed than philosophers to enact such an exam-
ination of life. Eschewing all forms of didacticism and moral-
ism upfront, artists working with and on life also actively 
contribute to the making of ethics. More often than not, such an 
endeavor involves running against our conventional under-
standing of nature and culture, structure and agency, life and 
death.
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